There Are Two Types and Two Systems of Cognitive Processes (2024)

This post was co-authored with Professor John Vervaeke¹.

Thinking, Fast and Slow is one of the great books written on cognition and decision making. In a clear and accessible fashion, it made popular the idea that we can divide the human mind up into two domains, which Daniel Kahneman identifies as System 1 and System 2. System 1 is a fast, automatic process that quickly sizes up a situation and jumps to a conclusion. System 2 is a slower, more deliberate process that attempts to work through the problem more systematically. An example that Kahneman uses to see these two systems is the “ball and a bat” problem:
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?

The “flash answer” that many people have is that the ball costs 10 cents. For Kahneman, this is an example of System 1 scanning and jumping to what seems obvious. But if you think about it more carefully and work through the logic, you realize this is an error. If the bat was $1 more than the ball and the ball was 10 cents, then the total would be $1.20. After some deliberation, most folks can figure out that the ball costs 5 cents and the bat $1.05. This correction is the work of System 2.

My graduate students and I (Henriques) read this book for cognitive psychology this semester, and we generally enjoyed it. Given my focus on the conceptual structure of psychology and its key ideas like mind, cognition, and behavior, we spent a fair amount of time discussing exactly how we should think about these two “systems.” I placed systems in quotation marks because, as Kahneman himself clearly notes, these two mental domains are not readily identifiable as two different brain systems. Rather, Kahneman used the two systems as a metaphor.

But this caveat raises the question: What exactly is being described here? Indeed, if you know the literature, you know that many scholars have proposed different terms for these cognitive processes. In addition to Kahneman's System 1 and System 2, we have Freud's primary and secondary, Keith Stanovich advocates for Type 1 and Type 2, and many in cognitive science use "automatic" versus "deliberate" or "controlled." This diversity of framing is consistent with a central point we have repeatedly made in our work together: there is much confusion and equivocation regarding the meaning of cognitive and the ontology of the mental and we need big picture perspectives to sort out the confusion.

We have each independently developed metatheories for psychology (Henriques) and cognitive science (Vervaeke). Over the last two years, we have found that they work together in a highly synergistic fashion. Interestingly, when we combine our metatheoretical viewpoints and look at the System 1 and 2 versus Type 1 and 2 terminologies, a new picture emerges. Specifically, we contend that it makes sense to divide human mental processes into two different types and two different systems.

To see the two types of cognitive processes, we can use Vervaeke’s metatheory of cognition. As described in this post, Vervaeke has posited a general model of cognition framed as the 3 Rs of recursive relevance realization. The short summary is that the mind works to scan the inputs for relevant information and then moves to realize both what is the case and what paths of action can be taken. In addition, there is a secondary recursive process that functions to place a check on the initial grip that the relevance realization process forms on the situation. This recursive process can then update the initial inference based on how it conforms to anticipated expectations and based on how it aligns with other modeling processes held in the mind.

Applying Vervaeke’s frame to the dual processing model, we can suggest that the initial sizing up of relevance to be realized can be framed as Type 1 processes. That is, when confronted with a scene or set of stimuli, there are a group of primary cognitive processes that are quickly making inferences about what is relevant and try to “realize” a match between the model it initially makes and the incoming information. Then there are Type 2 secondary recursive processes that operate to check the match and align it with other mental models. These Type 2 recursions come online if the first type of processing results in an unexpected surprise or if it conflicts with other models. As such, they function as a kind of deliberative and corrective process.

It is helpful to note that Keith Stanovich, who emphasized the Type 1 versus Type 2 terminology, proposed that the defining difference between Type 1 and Type 2 processes is that the latter involves working memory². Given the work of Hasher and others that working memory is a higher-order relevance filter where we can perform chunking and do counterfactual simulations of things, it makes sense to see working memory as an important hub of recursive relevance realization³. We also see that there is no clear dividing line between Type 1 and Type 2 processes, but a continuum of increasing demand placed on working memory. Such a continuum is less consistent with the idea of distinct systems. Thus, when we look at dual processing through the lens of Vervaeke’s model, we can see why a more accurate nomenclature is the Type 1 versus Type 2 processes.

However, there is another angle provided by Henriques' work on the Unified Theory of Knowledge (UTOK)⁵ that can validate the System 1 versus System 2 distinction. Early in the cognitive psychology course mentioned above, we covered Seymour Epstein’s American Psychologist article on Cognitive Experiential Self Theory⁵. In it, Epstein argued his model could effectively bridge an updated Freudian analysis with modern cognitive psychology. His model makes a clear distinction between the animal-mammal-primate portion of our cognitive structure and the more verbal, rational, self-conscious, self-reflective, justifying “person” mind.

Epstein's analysis aligns well with UTOK's formulation of humans as persons and primates⁶. Via Justification Systems Theory⁷, UTOK posits that we should think of the human ego as a mental organ of justification that evolves in response to the evolution of propositional language and the resulting question-answer dynamics of justification that emerge with it. UTOK’s model of human psychology thus posits that humans have a primary animal-mammal-primate system of nonverbal cognition and a secondary, self-conscious, justifying mind that is a propositional knowing system that allows us to navigate the Culture-Person plane of existence. As such, the primate-experiential system can be framed as “System 1” and the person-propositional system as “System 2”. Of course, the fact that there are these two systems does not mean that there are not important causal and function relations between the primate-experiential system and the person-propositional system. There are important connections between the respiratory and circulation systems within the body, but we can still understand them as different systems performing different functions.

When Henriques' analysis is placed in relation to the set of analyses framed by Vervaeke’s theory of recursive relevance realization, we can see that both types of cognitive processes would be present in both systems. That is, there are Type 1 (relevance realizing) and Type 2 (recursive checking) processes in both System 1 (primate-experiential) and System 2 (justifying person). In this analysis, the example of the ball and bat would be processed in System 2 because it is propositional, but the conclusion that the bat is $1 is a function of Type 1 processes in System 2. We can also see deliberation in the animal world, such as when crows engage in systematic, novel problem-solving. Such processes would be Type 2 processes taking place in System 1.

In short, when we merge Henriques' UTOK with Vervaeke’s metatheory of cognition, a new picture emerges. It is not that there are either systems or types of cognitive processes and that scholars simply differ in terminology. Rather, our conclusion is that, when it comes to the human mind, there are two types of processes that take place in two kinds of systems.

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